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I. ~..EASURES TAKEN! TO COOL the overheated
economy appear to be bearing some results. Growth
of spending has moderated over the past year, reduc-
ing “demand-pull” pressures for resources and on
prices. Reduction of excessive total demands and ac-
celerating inflation of necessity always involves costs
in the form of foregone production and continued
price increases for an extended time, The alternative
of continued accelerating inflation for prolonged pe-
riods is clearly unacceptable. An objective of current
stabilization policy has been to take actions which
will reduce inflation and restore stable economic
growth, while minimizing the costs of the transition.
The current inflation accelerated markedly from
1964 to 1969. Overall prices, which had been rising
less than 1½per cent a year in the early 1960’s,
increased 2 per cent in 1965, 3.5 per cent a year in
1966 and 1967, 4 per cent in 1968, and 5 per cent in
1969. The accelerating inflation reflected a rise in
total demands for goods and services at an average
8 per cent annual rate from late 1964 to late 1969, or
roughly double the rise in productive capacity. The
excessive rise in total spending was fostered in large
part by expansive monetary and fiscal actions from
1964 through 1968.
In an attempt to restrain total spending and price
inflation, fiscal actions became less expansionary in
mid-1968 and monetary actions in early 1969. As a re-
sult, spending growth has slowed markedly since early
last fall to a rate approximating the rising trend of
productive capacity. The upward momentum of
prices has continued virtually unabated despite the
lessening of demand pressure and cutbacks have oc-
curred in production.
In this article recent economic developments are
compared with conditions after past peaks in eco-
nomic activity to gain some insight into the costs
incurred and progress made in combatting inflationJ
tThe last three peaks in economic activity selected by the
National Bureau of Economic Research are May 1960, July
1957, and July 1953. In addition we note two othcr slow-
downs in activity, beginning October 1966 and July 1962.
August 1969 is used as a tentative peak for the cur-
rent period, since it is the middle month of the
quarter when real output was greatest.2 The pause
in spending, production and employment has been
much more moderate than in the 1.954, 1958, and
1960 recessions, and more nearly like the pauses of
1962 and 1966.
Spen.ding
Gro~vthin spending in recent quarters has been
much greater than after the three previous cyclical
peaks, and about the same as after the 1962 and








the third quarter last year to the first quarter this
year total spending rose at a 3.6 per cent annual
rate. During the first two quarters of the three pre-
vious business recessions, total spending declined at
an average 2.8 per cent rate. In the first two quarters
of the 1962 and 1966 pauses in activity> total spend-
ing rose at an average 4 per cent rate.
1
Any other month from last July to November might have
been selected.
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Prices
More of the growth in spending in late 1969 and
in 1970 was reflected in higher prices than after pre-
vious cyclical peaks. Overall prices (Table I) rose
5 per cent in the year ending with the third quarter
last year, and have increased at a slightly faster rate
since that quarter (reportedly a 5.5 per cent annual
rate, retroactively including portions of Government
wage increases). In the year preceding the peaks of
the previous three recessions, prices rose at an aver-
age of 2 per cent, and in the following two quarters
at an average 2.3 per cent annual rate.
Upward momentum of prices has been strong and
persistent in the three recessions. Price increases not
only intensified somewhat for a period of six months
or more after the excessive demand was eliminated,
but inflation usually persisted for several additional
years, although at a moderating rate. Many prices
and wages do not adjust upward at the time of the
most intensive demand pressure. This may be due
to inertia, lack of knowledge of costs, public opinion,
regulations, or contracts. These lagging price adjust-
ments place “cost-push” forces on other prices when
they do occur. Consequently, success in the struggle
against inflation typically takes a long period.
Production
Real product, like total spending, has reacted much
less in this pause than in the three recessions. From
the assumed peak last August to the first quarter
this year, real production declined at a 1.7 per cent
annual rate, while in each of the first two quarters
after the three previous cyclical turns, production
contracted much more sharply, averaging a —5.1 per
cent rate (Table I).
Industrial production, like total real product, has
changed much less than in the three recessions. The
decline in industrial production at a 3.3 per cent
rate from last August to April was much more modest
than during the first eight months of any of the three
previous recessions, when production fell at an aver-
age 14 per cent rate (Table II).
Employment trends also have been stronger in late
1969 and early 1970 than following the upper turn-
ing points of the three earlier cycles (Table II).
Since last August employment has increased at a 1
per cent rate, whuruas in the first eight months of
Real Product
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each of the thrcc previous recessions, it had declined
at an average rate of 3.8 per cent.
A greater portion of the population is now working
than at a comparable stage in earlier economic
slowdowns. In April the number employed was equal
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to 64.7 per cent of the population of working force
age (16 through 64), about the same as at the as-
sumed peak last August. From 1950 to late 1965 em-
ployment ranged between 60 and 63.4
per cent of population of working
force age, as shown in the accompany-
ing chart.
Other indicators of economic activ-
ity, both nominal and real, generally
confirm the evidence that the econ-
omy’s performance has been stronger
in the recent past than at a compara-
ble stage in previous economic pauses.
Personal income rose more rapidly af-
ter August 1969 than in the like peri-
ods following May 1960, July 1957, and
July 1953 (Table II). Construction ex-
penditures, adversely affected by fi-
nancial clisintermediation and usury
Industrial Production Payroll Employment
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Table II
CHANGES IN SELECTED MONTHLY ECONOMIC MEASURES
lAnnua! Rates of Change’)
Peak Month Industrial Employment Personal car.etrutt on
of Ecor’omk Activity Production P
0
yroli Inconie Expond’j’os
E;qb’ Months After Peak
Aurjusf 1969 —- 33 1.0 6.3 —1.3
Rocesso n s
May 1960 8.5 2.3 1.2 1.8
July 1957 194 52 06 2.0
July 1953 74.6 3.9 1.1 Li
Ave.’oge of 1960, 1967,
and 1953 poals 14.2 3.8 0.2 0.5
Slowdowns’
October 1966 3.5 2.4 6.2 1.0
July 1 9L2 3.1 1 4 4.8 0.2
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laws in the past year, were weaker titan after the
1953 and 1960 peaks but were stronger than in the
corresponding nionths after the 1957 peak. Unem-
ployment rates in 1970 have been lower than at cor-
responding periods in other recessions.
Retail sales have risen at roughly a 3 per cent an-
nual rate since last August, about the same rate of
expansion as in the previous year. In the correspond-
ing eight months after the three recessions, retail
sales declined at about a3per cent average rate.
Corporate profits after taxes declined at a 14 per cent
annual rate from the third quarter last year to the
first quarter this year, about half the average rate of
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Both stock and bond prices declined (yields rose)
from last August to May, while they increased in the
corresponding period of other recessions. Stock prices,
as measured by the Standard and Poor’s 500 com-
posite, declined 19 per cent from last August to May.
In the first nine months of the three previous reces-
sions, stocks rose an average 5 per cent. Interest rates
on highest grade corporate bonds rose 16 per cent
Interest Rates on Corporate Aaa Bonds
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from August to May, compared with an average 9
per cent decline in the corresponding period of the
three previous recessions. The rise in yields during
the current slowdown probably reflects rising infla-
tionary expectations following from the five—year ac-
celeration of prices.3
.Fisca! Conditions
Governlnent fiscal actions have not been uniform
around cyclical peaks. Both before and after the 1960
peak, fiscal actions, as measured by the high-employ-
ment budget, were quite restrictive. Around the 1957
peak, fiscal actions were moderately restrictive. In
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contrast, fiscal actions in the year before the 1953
peak were stimulative, and became progressively less
expansionary during the following recovery.
Fiscal actions changed from a sfimulative to a re-
strictive stance more than a year before August 1969,
with the imposition of the 10 per cent surtax in
mid-1968 and some slowing in the rate of Govern-
ment spending growth. The sharpest changes in
spending growth were in the defense sector, where
outlays contracted slightly after mid-1968 after rising
at a 17 per cent annual rate in the previous three
years. Nondefense Government spending has risen at
3
See William P. Yohe and Denis S. Karnosky “Interest Rates
and Price Level Changes, 1952-69,” this Review (December
1969), pp. 18-38.
a 10 per cent rate since mid-1968, following a 13
per cent rate of expansion from mid-1965 to mid-1988.
Since the first quarter of 1969, the high-employment
surplus, as estimated by this bank, has been in the
$7 to $11 billion range. Current expectations are that
this surplus will declme only moderately during the
summer and fall, although recent actions have caused
the anticipated surplus to be slightly less than ex-
pected in the January budget. The budget surplus
during 1969 and 1970 has been far less in relation
to total spending than in the 1961-64 period, when
the nation recovered from recession and experienced
balanced econolnic growth.
Monetary I)eu.:eiop.m.en.ts
Monetary actions, as measured by the growth of
the money stock, were relatively restrictive prior to
each of the four peaks and the two slowdowns. On
average, the money stock was virtually unchanged
for about nine months before the three previous busi-
ness cycle peaks. In the seven months before August
1969, money rose at a 2.8 per cent rate. This was faster
than immediately before any of the three recessions,
but was considerably slower than the 7 per cent rate
of increase during 1967 and 1968.
The general trend of the money stock following the
peaks of economic activity has been little change for
a brief period and then rapid rise. According to one
view, these developments may have intensified reces-
sions for a period, and then contributed to an excessive
rise in total spending and a resurgence of infla-
tion. On average, money remained virtually un-
changed during the first six months following the
Mottey Stock
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May 1960, July 1957, and July 1953 peaks. In the
subsequent three months money rose at an average
1 per cent annual rate, and then began expanding
at a faster 3 per cent average rate (compared with a
1.8 per cent trend over the entire 1953 to 1964 period).
Since August 1969, money has followed a similar.
but more pronounced, pattern than in the correspond-
ing periods after the three previous business cycle
peaks. In the first six months, from August to Febru-
ary, money remained about unchanged, except for a
temporary bulge around year-end. From February to
May money rose at a very rapid 10 per cent annual
rate, or in the 98th percentile of all consecutive three-
month rates of change since early 1950. This was
much faster than during the earlier recessions, and
even greater than after the mini-recession in early
1967.
The current hesitation in economic activity has
been more moderate than in the corresponding peri-
ods of the three previous recessions we have dis-
cussed. Total spending and other nominal measures
of economic activity have been much stronger re-
cently than after other cyclical peaks. Comparisons
using such measures have lost some of their meaning
in view of the much more rapid recent rate of infla-
tion. Nevertheless, most real measures of output and
employment also indicate that the economy has re-
cently been stronger than in the corresponding peri-
ods after the three previous cyclical peaks.
Progress in reducing the rate of price increase has
been slow. Prices are still being affected by the lag-
ged impacts of previous excesses. Some prices have
been restrained by regulation (public utility rates),
by contracts (prices of some materials and labor serv-
ices), by public opinion, by inertia, or by a money
illusion. When these prices adjust upward, cost-push
pressures are placed on other prices. Previous experi-
ence indicates that because of the slow response of
some prices, and cost-push pressures, the momentum
of inflation generally continues for several years after
excessive demands have been eliminated.
Since the inflation generated in the 1965 through
1968 period is much more severe than in any other
period since the early 1950’s, and since the restraint
on total spending has been less than in other periods
of correction, it is likely to require a longer period
than usual to correct, particularly if the costs in terms
of lost production are to be at a moderate level.
Hence, even though the current economic slowdown
has been milder than previous recessions, it may last
longer, especially if substantial progress is to be made
in the struggle against inflation.
Questions arise as to whether some alternative pol-
icies or tools might better accomplish the desired re-
sults. Some feel that monetary and fiscal actions are
too slow or clumsy for pursuing the objective of rea-
sonable price stability. It has been suggested that the
fight against inflation might be facilitated by wage,
price and credit controls, either by law or by use of
moral suasion. Controls raise serious questions of ad-
ministration and enforcement, reduce freedom of de-
cision for the individual, and cause misallocation of
resources.4 Such controls are no substitute for proper
monetary and fiscal actions, and probably do not
hasten the adjustment to price stability even when
proper stabilization policies are followed. Many up-
ward price adjustments to restore normal price rela-
tions are made long after excessive demand pressures
are removed because some prices are inflexible in the
short-run. Controls add to the inflexibihty, and reduce
further the efficiency of the economic system. Con-
trols also raise questions of equity and efficiency be-
tween those sectors where prices are freely flexible,
and have already adjusted, and those sectors where
rigidities have held back price adjustments.
~“Selective Credit — No Substitute for Monetary Restraint,”
this Review (December 1969), pp. 13-17,
.. I
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